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THE BIGGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL AND EXPLOIT
ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS
BEN CLEMENTS*
INTRODUCTION
A handful of global corporations have taken control of the internet,
the dominant medium of modern communication and commerce, and have
used that control to create and sell databases of personal information of
Americans and to systematically amplify dangerous disinformation and
violence on an unprecedented scale. This has created a growing threat to
our democracy and our people.
While our elected officials and many in the media claim to recognize
the danger, a corporate-friendly First Amendment absolutism and
misguided fears about chilling voices on the internet have preempted any
serious effort at reform or regulation. Neither the First Amendment nor
the desire to protect the robust exchange of ideas on the internet justifies
this inaction. Instead, legislation that would protect personal privacy and
autonomy on the internet and hold Big Tech companies accountable for
promoting fraudulent disinformation and violence would be consistent
with the First Amendment and would, in fact, strengthen the free exchange
of ideas on the internet.
Section I of this Article explains how the highly profitable Big Tech
business model is built on exploiting individual privacy and autonomy at
great risk to our democracy and public welfare and how Congress has
failed to take any meaningful action to address this threat. Section II
provides a summary of a legislative solution—the proposed Big Tech
Accountability Act—that would hold Big Tech companies accountable for
the substantial public harm that they cause, without violating anyone’s
*
Ben Clements is an attorney, author, and advocate for political and governmental
reform, and serves as the chairman and senior legal advisor of Free Speech For People, a
national non-profit organization defending our democracy and challenging corruption and
abuse of corporate power.
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First Amendment rights. Section III summarizes and rebuts the common
First Amendment, and other, objections to imposing liability on social
media companies. Finally, the Article concludes with the full text of the
proposed Big Tech Accountability Act.
I. THE URGENT NEED TO HOLD BIG TECH ACCOUNTABLE
In recent years, global technology companies—often known as “Big
Tech”—and specifically the biggest social media companies, have
emerged as perhaps the biggest corporate threat to our constitutional
democracy. They have mastered the corporate playbook of using a
combination of big-money lobbying, massive campaign spending, and
heavily funded propaganda campaigns to deter and prevent any
meaningful government regulation; to facilitate unprecedented
monopolistic growth; and to ensure that they continue to enjoy immunity
from legal accountability1 that has never been available to other
communications companies, whether print or broadcast. And they have
built a multi-billion-dollar business model that profits from exploiting and
selling the personal information of virtually every American and
facilitating and promoting disinformation and violence that undermine our
democracy, our healthcare, our civil rights, and our capacity for rational
self-government.
The result has been colossal wealth for the Big Tech companies and
their owners, but at the expense of the autonomy and privacy of most
Americans, and at great risk to our democracy and our individual and
collective welfare. The Big Tech business model, which thrives on
promoting the most sensational—and generally false—material through
the use of highly efficient algorithms, has caused or contributed to a
staggering array of serious public harm, including physical and
psychological disorders2 and suicidal ideation among young people;3 the
inability to effectively address major healthcare issues,4 including the

1. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
2. E.g., Georgia Wells et al., Facebook Knows Instagram Is Toxic for Teen Girls,
Company Documents Show, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2021, 7:59 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-companydocuments-show-11631620739 [https://perma.cc/L3JD-7DEG].
3. Karen Feldscher, How Social Media’s Toxic Content Sends Teens into ‘A Dangerous
Spiral’, HARV. T.H. CHAN (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/features/howsocial-medias-toxic-content-sends-teens-into-a-dangerous-spiral/
[https://perma.cc/R3DLDT2E]; Ysabel Gerrard & Tarleton Gillespie, When Algorithms Think You Want to Die, WIRED
(Feb. 21, 2019, 12:41 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/when-algorithms-think-you-want-todie/ [https://perma.cc/XB6Z-DTAC].
4. See Victor Suarez-Lledo & Javier Alavrez-Galvez, Prevalence of Health
Misinformation on Social Media: Systematic Review, 23 J MED. INT. RSCH., no. 1, 2021, at 1,
https://www.jmir.org/2021/1/e17187/PDF [https://perma.cc/RMT9-ZEYG].
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COVID-19 pandemic;5 facilitating sexual predation and exploitation;6
violence and genocide;7 interfering with free and fair elections;8 and
inciting a violent insurrection at the United States Capitol.9 Despite
growing public concern and the highly publicized shows of outrage from
our politicians, Congress has failed to take any meaningful action.
Every few months, in the face of the latest revelations of abuses,
Congress holds show hearings and invites the Big Tech executives to
appear.10 Members of Congress use these hearings to publicly condemn
the Big Tech companies and their top executives and to threaten some
unspecified action. But the action never materializes. Instead, the
congressional hearings end up serving as a platform for the Big Tech
executives to offer misleading defenses and walk away with empty
reassurances about how hard they are trying to protect us11 from the venom
that they are in fact actively promoting on their platforms.
For example, recent revelations from Facebook (now Meta)
whistleblowers indicate that while Facebook executives publicly claim
that they are seeking to combat harmful content on their platforms, they
have in fact knowingly allowed it to flourish. “Facebook, over and over

5. Terry Collins, ‘This Deception Must End Now’: Facebook Gets Letter from 500 Health
Professionals Demanding Data on COVID Misinformation, USA TODAY (Nov. 5, 2021, 11:53
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/11/05/facebook-covid-misinformationdoctors-letter/6275730001/ [https://perma.cc/MG6A-AGN8].
6. Kari Paul, Over 300 Cases of Child Exploitation Went Unnoticed by Facebook – Study,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
4,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/mar/04/facebook-child-exploitationtechnology [https://perma.cc/8SMK-MDV9].
7. E.g., Paul Mozur, A Genocide Incited on Facebook, With Posts from Myanmar’s
Military,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/technology/myanmar-facebook-genocide.html
[https://perma.cc/HL5B-PRBG].
8. Geoffrey A. Fowler, Twitter and Facebook Warning Labels Aren’t Enough to Save
WASH.
Democracy,
POST
(Nov.
9,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/09/facebook-twitter-electionmisinformation-labels/ [https://perma.cc/CMR7-W5H5].
9. Craig Timber et al., Inside Facebook, Jan. 6 Violence Fueled Anger, Regret over
Missed
Warning
Signs,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
22,
2021,
7:36
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/22/jan-6-capitol-riot-facebook/
[https://perma.cc/3GKD-KXDC].
10. Tony Romm, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google Grilled on Capitol Hill over
Their
Market
Power,
WASH.
POST
(July
29,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/29/apple-google-facebook-amazoncongress-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/FT8M-FHVF].
11. See, e.g., Dean DeChiaro, Social Media Algorithms Threaten Democracy, Experts
Tell
Senators,
ROLL
CALL
(Apr.
27,
2021,
3:08
PM),
https://www.rollcall.com/2021/04/27/social-media-algorithms-threaten-democracy-expertstell-senators/ [https://perma.cc/KP42-GU7T].
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again, has shown it chooses profit over safety.”12 A pair of complaints
filed with the Securities Exchange Commission in February 2022 allege,
based on internal Facebook documents, that Facebook executives made
false assurances to the public and members of the Senate about its
purported efforts to combat climate change and COVID-19
disinformation, both of which continue to proliferate on their platforms.13
The Big Tech companies and their allies have been as successful at
manipulating public discourse as they have been at neutering Congress.
There is little discussion about passing laws that would hold Big Tech
companies accountable for the massive public harm they cause. Instead,
we buy into this fiction that any attempt to do so would violate the First
Amendment. They have sold the public on the contradictory propositions
that they cannot be held accountable for what third parties post on their
platforms because it is the third parties and not the platforms that are doing
the speaking and yet, at the same time, that it would violate the supposed
free speech rights of the platforms to hold them accountable for speech
that they insist they are not speaking.14
This propaganda doublespeak has been so effective that there is no
serious effort to hold Big Tech platforms accountable for facilitating and
amplifying disinformation and violence. Rather than regulating them like
any other business, we treat the Big Tech companies like sovereign states,
urging them to voluntarily introduce better oversight and moderating
practices. But these pleas are destined to fail so long as these companies
continue to profit without accountability from targeted amplification of
disinformation, threats of violence, and other harmful conduct.
II.THE PROPOSED BIG TECH ACCOUNTABILITY ACT—SUMMARY
It does not have to be this way. Free Speech For People,15 a national
non-profit organization working to protect our constitutional democracy,
has launched a campaign for legislative reform that would address the
most serious damage caused by Big Tech social media companies.
Constitutional lawyers at Free Speech For People have crafted model
federal legislation, the Big Tech Accountability Act,16 to hold social
12. Ryan Mac & Cecilia Kang, Whistle-Blower Says Facebook ‘Chooses Profits over
Safety’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/technology/whistleblower-facebook-frances-haugen.html [https://perma.cc/F45Q-CJQJ].
13. Cat Zakrzewski, Facebook Whistleblower Alleges Executives Misled Investors About
Climate, Covid Hoaxes in New SEC Complaint, WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2022, 7:00 A.M.),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/02/18/whistleblower-facebook-secclimate-change/ [https://perma.cc/4SP2-SPMN].
14. See infra notes 23–24.
15. FREESPECHFORPEOPLE.ORG, https://freespeechforpeople.org/
[https://perma.cc/3KM6-Y98Y].
16. The Big Tech Accountability Act, FREESPEECHFORPEOPLE.ORG,
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media companies accountable; to protect internet users, voters, and the
broader community from the dangers of rampant amplification of
disinformation and violence; and to protect online personal privacy and
autonomy.
While the Big Tech Accountability Act addresses a wide range of
threats posed by Big Tech, it does not rely on censorship by the
government of either Big Tech companies or their users. Nor does it rely
on the government mandating what content Big Tech companies should
or should not screen or government mandates about whether and how to
amplify or promote specific content. Instead, the Big Tech Accountability
Act applies traditional and well-established legal principles for holding
accountable persons or companies that make or promote fraudulent, false,
and deceptive statements or statements made in a manner calculated to
cause significant public harm and that promote violent criminal acts.
The Big Tech Accountability Act, the text of which is set forth in full
below, has five key elements.17 First, it would amend § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act18 to limit the blanket immunity of that
section to internet platforms that do not in fact act as publishers. It would
remove the immunity for internet companies that (a) engage in targeted
amplification of content, (b) recklessly encourage or facilitate the spread
of disinformation or violence, or (c) intentionally profit from amplifying
disinformation or violence. This amendment would reinforce the original
purpose of § 230 by preserving immunity for those companies that operate
as passive platforms for users to post content, but it would level the
playing field by treating those platforms that manipulate or target that
content like any other publisher.
Second, the Act would ban “surveillance advertising,”19 except for
targeting of individuals based on geography and sorting for relevance
based on individual search terms. While serving to reduce inequities and
information distortion from targeting of content, this provision would also
reduce the current incentives for Big Tech companies to collect and
exploit people’s personal data.20
Third, the Act would establish new federal criminal and civil liability
https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/big-tech-accountabilityact_1_2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K4Y-PGFK]; see also infra pp. 13–28.
17. See infra pp. 13–28.
18. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61.
19. Accountable Tech defines “surveillance advertising” as “the practice of extensively
tracking and profiling individuals and groups, and then microtargeting ads at them based on
their behavioral history, relationships, and identity.” Gilad Edelman, This Group Wants to ‘Ban
Surveillance
Advertising’,
WIRED
(Mar.
22,
2021,
12:00
PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/ban-surveillance-advertising-coalition-launches/
[https://perma.cc/R45U-MUMU].
20. Paul Jarvis, We Must Ban Targeted Advertising Immediately, FATHOM/ (Apr. 8,
2020), https://usefathom.com/blog/targeted-ads [https://perma.cc/NV6E-HAPN].
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for knowingly disseminating fraudulent civic information, such as
disinformation relating to voting, healthcare, or other essential
government services, and for conducting targeted amplification of
fraudulent civic information with reckless disregard for the risk of
substantial public harm.
Fourth, the Act would establish new federal criminal and civil
liability for engaging in targeted amplification of threats or solicitations
to commit violent crimes—a provision modeled on existing federal law
generally prohibiting the solicitation of violent crimes.
Finally, the Act would direct the Federal Trade Commission to make
recommendations for prohibiting the aggregation and sale of personal
information without informed and meaningful consent.
III. THE OBJECTIONS TO REGULATING BIG TECH DO NOT JUSTIFY
INACTION
This section addresses the most common arguments made against
accountability for social media companies. First, the argument that such
accountability would violate the First Amendment is based on the
mistaken assumption that accountability requires government
“censorship.” But the Big Tech Accountability Act would instead impose
liability for amplifying fraudulent statements and encouragement of
violence following well-established and permissible legal approaches.
Second, contrary to the defenders of the status quo, continuing to
immunize Big Tech from accountability hinders rather than promotes the
free exchange of ideas on the internet. Third, existing laws are woefully
inadequate to address the threats of amplified disinformation and violence,
particularly while § 230 immunity remains in place. Fourth, holding Big
Tech legally accountable would decrease, rather than increase, the risk of
political and government manipulation of social media. Fifth, the answer
to racial discrimination by the social media companies is not to continue
immunizing them for the promotion of racist violence, but instead, to
subject internet companies to the civil rights protections that already apply
to other public accommodations. Finally, the fact that holding Big Tech
companies accountable would require them to change their business
models is an argument for, rather than against, accountability.
A. First Amendment Objections to Holding Big Tech Accountable Are
Unfounded
It is widely assumed that government regulation to hold the big social
media companies legally accountable for the content that they amplify on
their platforms would run afoul of the First Amendment. To the extent
that any reasoning is offered for this view, it typically rests on the notion
that any effort to hold social media companies accountable would
necessarily rely on government mandates or government “censorship” of
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“false,” or even merely objectionable, content.21
Contrary to these assumptions, the Big Tech Accountability Act does
not give the government the power to mandate what or how internet
companies choose to host or promote on their platform. Nor does it give
the government any power to “censor” false, objectionable, or any other
speech. It leaves the internet companies with the power that they currently
have to make those decisions themselves. But when they choose to engage
in promoting, amplifying, and targeting content, rather than simply acting
as passive public forums, the Big Tech Accountability Act holds them
accountable for substantial public harm caused by their promotion,
amplification, or targeting of civic disinformation and solicitations to
criminal violence.
There are several reasons that this approach does not run afoul of the
First Amendment. As an initial matter, it is not clear that the Big Tech
platforms, as distinct from their users, have any First Amendment interest
in the content hosted on their platforms. Their favored argument against
accountability—and the rationale behind the immunity they enjoy under
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act22—is that they are neither the
speaker nor the publisher of that content and therefore cannot be held
accountable.23 Indeed, the internet companies often insist that they cannot
be accused of intentionally targeting and amplifying disinformation and
violent content because they have no knowledge of the content and are
unable (or unwilling) to monitor for such content.24 But this claim does

21. See Nadine Strossen, Disinfo v. Democracy, TABLET (Sept. 19, 2021),
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/disinformation-nadine-strossen
[https://perma.cc/BKY8-YVQS].
22. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
23. For example, in Gonzalez v. Google, LLC, Google argued, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, that § 230 protected Google from liability for its role in promoting ISIS videos that
helped lead to a massive deadly shooting in Paris, despite the fact that Google used algorithms
to recommend the terrorist videos (on YouTube) to persons that Google determined were likely
to respond favorably to them. Gonzalez v. Google, LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 894–95 (9th Cir. 2021).
The court explained that, even though Google recommended the ISIS videos “based upon users’
viewing history and what is known about the users,” it did not create or develop the content,
and therefore could not be held liable. Id. at 893–95. Other courts have likewise accepted these
arguments on behalf of Big Tech companies. See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53,
68–71 (2d Cir. 2019) (adopting Facebook’s argument that it was not the “creator or developer”
of terrorist postings that Facebook recommended on its platform and therefore could not be
liable for the resulting terrorist acts).
24. See, e.g., Hearing Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on
Energy and Commerce Subcommittees on Consumer Protection & Commerce and
Communications
&
Technology,
117
Cong.
7
(2021),
https://www.congress.gov/117/meeting/house/111407/witnesses/HHRG-117-IF16-WstateZuckerbergM-20210325-U1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EYG-QG9R] (testimony of Mark
Zuckerberg, CEO, Facebook, Inc.) (“Platforms should not be held liable if a particular piece of
content evades its detection—that would be impractical for platforms with billions of posts per
day.”).
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not bring their actions within the protection of the First Amendment. To
the contrary, it defeats any First Amendment defense: if they indeed have
no knowledge of the content that they are amplifying, then they are
engaged in purely transactional conduct, not expressive speech.
Even assuming, however, that internet companies have First
Amendment interests in the content on their sites—either directly or on
behalf of their users—the liability provisions of the Big Tech
Accountability Act are fully consistent with the First Amendment.
While the First Amendment protects some “false” speech and the
government may not pass a law simply banning whole categories of
speech solely based on it being “false,”25 the courts have long recognized
that false speech that creates tangible public harm may properly be
regulated. Perhaps the most famous example is the illustration provided
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: “The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.”26 Thus, as the Supreme Court has recently recognized,
false statements may properly form the basis for civil and criminal liability
in cases involving “defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable
harm associated with a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy or
the costs of vexatious litigation.”27
Indeed, most criminal laws (apart from those involving violent
crime), especially at the federal level, hold people accountable for harmful
false speech. For example, every criminal offense involving fraud,
including insurance fraud,28 bank fraud,29 consumer fraud,30 securities
fraud,31 and tax fraud32—even passing bad checks33—punishes people for
false speech. Other examples include making false statements to the
government,34 falsifying documents or information in connection with a
government investigation,35 and perjury.36 And on the civil side, there are

25. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
26. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
27. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 719.
28. FindLaw
Staff,
Insurance
Fraud,
FINDLAW,
https://www.findlaw.com/criminal/criminal-charges/insurance-fraud.html
[https://perma.cc/M4Y6-3JE2]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1035.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
30. See, e.g., Types of Consumer Fraud, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/consumers-and-communities/consumer-protection/fraudresources/types-of-consumer-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/X4N8-GWQ2].
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1348.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 7206.
33. E.g.,
Will
Kenton,
Bad
Check,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bad-check.asp [https://perma.cc/SB5H-T8JU].
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1621.
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numerous laws holding people accountable for harmful false speech,
including libel and slander laws,37 civil fraud laws,38 unfair and deceptive
practices laws,39 and many more.
Nor does the First Amendment prevent the government from
prohibiting making threats or solicitations of criminal acts of violence.40
Many state and federal laws already prohibit threatening violence. An
existing federal statute makes it a crime to solicit, induce, or persuade
another to engage in criminal activity involving the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against property or persons.41 The Big
Tech Accountability Act provision is modeled on that federal law and
extends it to internet companies in circumstances in which they have
engaged in targeting and amplification of the unlawful solicitations.
B. Immunizing Big Tech from Accountability Does Not Promote Free
Speech on the Internet
Many continue to argue that internet companies must remain immune
from accountability to ensure that their users are free to post whatever they
want without the risk of screening, censoring, or manipulation by the
internet companies.42 Indeed, when the Communications Decency Act
was passed in 1996, the idea behind immunity for internet companies was
to enable online platforms to allow users to post content without risking
liability for everything and anything that a user might choose to post.43
But the big internet companies have long since stopped being passive
platforms for people to post content; they instead play an active role in
curating, amplifying, and targeting content—often illegal content—for
their own profit. Contrary to its original purpose, § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act now serves to protect massive targeting by
the biggest platforms,44 undermining the ability of ordinary people to
37. E.g., Defamation, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/defamation
[https://perma.cc/S3R9-KC3A].
38. E.g., Fraud, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fraud
[https://perma.cc/559Y-JPBT].
39. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
40. “Speech integral to criminal conduct, such as fighting words, threats, and
solicitations, remain categorically outside [First Amendment] protection.” United States v.
White, 610 F.3d 956, 960 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Williams, 533 U.S. 285, 297
(2008); Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969)).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 373.
42. E.g., Jason Kelley, Section 230 Is Good, Actually, EFF (Dec. 3, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/section-230-good-actually
[https://perma.cc/8NVNF4Q3].
43. Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14 (2020)
(statement of Justice Thomas respecting the denial of certiorari) (summarizing the background
and purpose of § 230 provisions).
44. See id. at 15–18 (summarizing the expansive scope of immunity that courts have
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reach a broad audience by amplifying the biggest sellers—disinformation
fraudsters, white supremacists, neo-Nazis, and other fanatics—and
drowning out the voices of ordinary people.45
The revised immunity under the Big Tech Accountability Act, by
contrast, would discourage this kind of amplification by holding platforms
that do it accountable, while leaving fully protected those platforms that
provide an open, un-curated platform, giving a fighting chance for
ordinary people to be heard above the rage of the racists and propagators
of disinformation. The Big Tech Accountability Act would amend the
Communications Decency Act to remove immunity only for internet
companies that (a) target the dissemination of the content to an individual
or specific group of individuals; (b) act knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently in encouraging or facilitating the spread of disinformation or
violence; or (c) intentionally engage in a course of business that receives
a financial benefit from amplifying disinformation or violence. And it
would create new liability for internet companies only when they engage
in this type of harmful amplification of fraudulent disinformation or
violence.
C. Existing Laws Are Inadequate to Address the Threat Posed by Big
Tech
Some have argued that existing laws, such as fraud, defamation, and
perjury laws, under which persons making certain harmful false
statements (on or off the internet) can already be held accountable, are as
far as the law should go to address disinformation and violence promotion
on the internet.46 But the dangers of disinformation and violence on the
internet do not primarily flow from the making of false or violent
statements by individual people. Rather, they are the result of systematic
selecting, amplifying, and targeting by powerful corporations of
fraudulent and violent statements—a process that magnifies the
destructive power of a false or violent statement to a historically
unprecedented level. Current law provides no remedy for this conduct
and this harm. To the contrary, through § 230 of the Communications

applied under § 230 and arguing that this expansive interpretation is unsupported by the text or
intent of the statute); see also supra note 23.
45. In one chilling example, in February 2019—a year before the arrival of COVID-19
and almost two years before the availability of COVID-19 vaccines—it was reported that nonprofit organizations attempting to post public service announcements promoting vaccinations
had to give up because YouTube’s algorithms would redirect users from the pro-vaccine videos
to baseless antivaccination propaganda videos. Brandy Zadrozny, Drowned Out by the
Algorithm: Vaccination Advocates Struggle to Be Heard Online, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2019,
2:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/drowned-out-algorithm-pro-vaccinationadvocates-struggle-be-heard-online-n976321 [https://perma.cc/KLP4-B7TM]; see also supra
notes 2–9.
46. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 21.
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Decency Act, current law thwarts any possible remedy.47 The Big Tech
Accountability Act would fix that.
D. The Big Tech Accountability Act Would Reduce, Rather than
Increase, the Ability of Powerful Politicians and Government
Officials to Manipulate Social Media
Some argue that enacting legislation to hold social media companies
accountable will invite politically motivated enforcement by government
officials. For example, if this enforcement mechanism had been available
to the Donald Trump Justice Department, one could certainly imagine a
Justice Department demand that social media companies take down any
posting associated with Black Lives Matter or face enforcement action
based on the dubious allegation that Black Lives Matter organizers were
promoting unlawful violence at protests against police brutality. There
are several reasons that this fear provides no basis to give Big Tech a pass
on accountability.
First, nothing in the Big Tech Accountability Act would give the
Department of Justice the power to impose a prior restraint on categories
of speech based on the source of that speech. To the contrary, the Act
provides for enforcement based only on specific unlawful solicitations of
violence or specific conduct to knowingly make or amplify fraudulent
civic disinformation.
Second, the Big Tech Accountability Act, like any other federal or
state law, would be subject to all applicable constitutional constraints. An
attempt by the Department of Justice to effectively shut down Black Lives
Matter speech on social media would face compelling legal challenges on
First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Due Process grounds.
Third, the risk of misuse of federal law enforcement powers by a
corrupt Department of Justice to manipulate the substance of social media
discourse is not unique to the Big Tech Accountability Act. While current
law immunizes internet companies from being held liable as speakers or
publishers of content on their platforms, these companies are subject to
antitrust laws, criminal and civil fraud laws, securities laws, and many
more—all of which could be misused by a corrupt Justice Department to
manipulate content on social media.
Fourth, as with those other laws, government enforcement of the Big
Tech Accountability Act would necessarily go through the courts and be
subject to judicial review, providing a check against misuse.
Finally, the danger of government manipulation of social media
companies for self-serving political purposes is arguably greater under our
47. Section 230 prohibits treating internet companies “as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another” person or entity. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). While the Act states
that it does not preempt any federal criminal law, id. § 230(e)(1), no such law directly addresses
internet company amplification of disinformation and threats of violence.
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current system in which the companies have immunity for their conduct
in screening and amplifying content. Under current law, neither private
parties, state governments, nor the federal government can hold social
media companies legally accountable for promoting unlawful conduct.48
But in this vacuum, powerful politicians and government officials are free
to use their bully pulpit, the threat of regulation, or unrelated law
enforcement actions, to manipulate how social media companies screen
and target. Moving this oversight from the back room into the open and
into the courts would ultimately reduce, rather than increase, the risk of
corrupt government manipulation of social media companies.
E. Nothing in the Big Tech Accountability Act Would Increase the Risk
of Discrimination on Social Media Platforms
In a similar vein, some claim that any attempt to hold Big Tech
accountable for promoting disinformation and violence will backfire and
encourage the big social media companies to discriminate against persons
of color and civil rights organizations. This argument suffers from some
of the same flaws as the notion that accountability for Big Tech will
increase the risk of corrupt government manipulation of social media.
First, neither § 230 nor any other aspect about the current system
protects persons of color and other marginalized groups from
discrimination on the internet. To the contrary, online discrimination is
one of the many problems with the current system. Indeed, one study
suggested that social media companies are more likely to flag and screen
content posted by black people than by white people.49
To suggest that discouraging social media companies from
discriminating against racial groups requires permitting them to facilitate
racist violence by white supremacists and neo-Nazis without
accountability is backwards. This rationale is akin to suggesting that we
should not penalize property owners who allow terrorists or racists to use
their properties to facilitate violent attacks because holding them
accountable might cause them to exclude persons of color from their
properties. But we do not take that counterintuitive approach; instead, we
have laws prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations.
Similarly, the answer to racial discrimination by social media companies
is not to leave them free to facilitate racist violence on their platforms, but
instead to treat internet companies like public accommodations and

48. See supra note 47.
49. Shirin Ghaffary, The Algorithms That Detect Hate Speech Online Are Biased Against
Black
People,
VOX:
RECODE
(Aug.
15,
2019,
11:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/15/20806384/social-media-hate-speech-bias-blackafrican-american-facebook-twitter [https://perma.cc/T7XW-FH7H].
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prohibit racial discrimination by such companies.50
F. The Claim that Regulation of Internet Platforms Would Strengthen
the Biggest Social Media Companies at the Expense of Small
Internet Companies Is Misguided and Misleading
Another frequent objection to holding internet companies
accountable is that accountability would hit hardest upon small
businesses, who have fewer resources to comply and defend against
litigation, and thereby only serve to strengthen the biggest offenders. This
objection ignores the actual substance of the Big Tech Accountability Act
and boils down to an unsustainable argument against government
regulation of any business.
By creating new liability for social media companies that use
algorithms or other sorting methods to amplify and target fraudulent civic
disinformation and violence, the Big Tech Accountability Act is most
clearly directed at companies that have adopted a business model of
profiting from promoting unlawful material. The notion that this approach
would more likely ensnare small companies trying to promote their lawful
businesses on the internet, rather than the Big Tech companies whose
biggest profit center lies in the promotion of unlawful material, makes no
sense on its face.
Further, the argument that government regulation will harm small
companies least able to afford compliance is a convenient shield against
all government regulation of business. The same argument could be made
against environmental regulation because the biggest most powerful
polluters have the most resources to avoid or defend against the law; food
safety laws, on the ground that they pose more challenging compliance
issues for small restaurants and grocers than industrial food
conglomerates; and worker protection laws, on the ground that small
businesses have fewer resources and less flexibility to comply than global
corporations. Similar arguments could be made with respect to any
business regulation. It is no surprise then, that the most vociferous
objectors to internet platform regulation are the big global technology
companies.
G. The Likelihood that Big Internet Companies Would Need to Change
Their Business Models to Comply with the Big Tech Accountability
Act Is Not an Argument Against the Act
There is little doubt that complying with the Big Tech Accountability
Act could require the largest internet companies to substantially change
their business models. This is as it should be. The model of the major
50. Kristen Clarke & David Brody, It’s Time for an Online Civil Rights Act, THE HILL
(Aug. 3, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/civil-rights/400310-its-time-for-anonline-civil-rights-act?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/GD6F-GC3F].
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internet companies has served their owners well, allowing a handful of
people to achieve a level of personal wealth nearly unprecedented in
human history. But a model that is based on collecting and exploiting
everyone’s personal information, on manipulating people’s online
experience, and on amplifying and promoting dangerous disinformation
and violence to maximize profit does not deserve protection. It deserves
regulation and reform.
CONCLUSION
All of the reforms set out in the Big Tech Accountability Act could
be enacted in a manner consistent with the First Amendment and would
build on existing time-tested models for holding people accountable for
fraudulent and other criminal acts that are now being facilitated by social
media companies. And the reforms are entirely consistent with the
manner in which we have traditionally regulated corporations whose
business practices threaten significant public harm. They would likely
require the biggest social media companies to make significant reforms to
their business model. But that is exactly what we need to happen if we
want an internet that is compatible with a functioning democracy and
rational self-government.
THE PROPOSED BIG TECH ACCOUNTABILITY ACT—FULL TEXT
THE BIG TECH ACCOUNTABILITY ACT
A Bill to foster accountability for digital content providers.
Section 1. Short Title.
This Act may be cited as the “Big Tech Accountability Act”.
Section 2. Purpose.
The purpose of this Act is to foster accountability by online
platforms and other internet service providers; to protect internet
users, voters, and the broader community from the dangers of
rampant amplification of disinformation and violence; and to
protect online personal privacy and autonomy against commercial
exploitation.
Section 3. Liability for Promoting Fraudulent Civic Information.
(a) Chapter 47 of the United States Code Title 18 is amended by
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adding at the end the following:
Section 1041. False Information About Essential Government
Services or Processes.
(a) In general—Whoever, in interstate or foreign commerce,
knowingly conveys or disseminates fraudulent civic
misinformation, for the purpose or with the reasonable
expectation of causing other persons to believe and rely
or act upon such information in a manner reasonably
expected to cause substantial public harm, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
(b) Publishing Entity Liability. Any publishing entity, or
person acting on its behalf who, in interstate or foreign
commerce, aids in the dissemination of fraudulent civic
misinformation that violates subsection (b) of this
section, by
(1) knowingly disseminating, publishing, or
broadcasting fraudulent civic misinformation, or
(2) conducting individualized targeting to disseminate,
publish, or broadcast the fraudulent civic
misinformation, with reckless disregard for the risk
of substantial public harm shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(c) Limitations. Nothing in this section shall be construed
to prohibit, impair, or limit:
(1) efforts to report or correct false or misleading
information;
(2) good faith efforts to summarize or explain facts
pertaining to essential government services or
processes or data, guidance, or other information
conveyed by government agencies;
(3) any lawfully authorized investigative, protective, or
intelligence activity of a law enforcement agency of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision of
a State, or of any intelligence agency of the United
States; or
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(4) expressions of opinion about, including
disagreement with, facts pertaining to essential
government services or processes or data, guidance,
or other information conveyed by government
agencies.
(d) Definitions.
(1) “Publishing entity” means any print publisher;
radio-broadcast licensee; broadcast, cable, or local
television station; provider of an interactive
computer service as defined in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(2); covered online platform as defined in 47
U.S.C. § 232(d)(1); or agency or medium for the
dissemination of advertising.
(2) “Fraudulent civic misinformation” means:
(A) Materially false, fraudulent, or misleading
information pertaining to essential government
services or processes, including government
services concerning public health and safety,
voting and voter registration, elections, the
census, civil rights, and education; or
(B) Data, guidance, or information that is
materially false, fraudulent, or misleading and
that is falsely attributed to a government
agency, or falsely asserted to have been
sanctioned or authored by a government
agency.
“Fraudulent civic misinformation” does not include any
statement or information accompanied by a prominent
disclaimer that clearly characterizes the statement or
information as fiction, satire, humor, or criticism, if the
disclaimer is presented in a way that is reasonable under
the circumstances.
(3) “Individualized targeting” occurs when a publishing
entity:
(A) performs or causes to perform any
computational process (including one based on
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algorithmic models, machine learning,
statistical analysis, or other data processing or
artificial intelligence techniques) designed to
transmit or display, highlight, emphasize, or
make more prominent, the content to a subset
of the users of such platform selected based on
personal information pertaining to the
individuals who make up the subset of users; or
(B) allows another person to instruct a publishing
entity to transmit or display, highlight,
emphasize, or make more prominent, the
content to a subset of the users of such
publishing entity, including by providing to
such person a list of individuals, contact
information of individuals, or other personal
information that can be used to identify
individuals.
Provided, however, that displaying, highlighting,
emphasizing, or making more prominent, content in
direct response to requests made or search terms entered
by an individual, such that any individual making such
requests or entering such search terms would produce the
same display, does not constitute individualized targeting
under this section.
(4) “Personal information” means any information that
is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific
individual or a specific device, including but not
limited to an individual’s actual or perceived
characteristics or demographics and information that
may be derived from such individual’s internet
browsing history, and including de-identified
information.
(5) “Substantial public harm” means direct and actual
damage to property; grievous personal injury or
death; damage to the health or safety of the general
public; or diversion of law enforcement or other
public health and safety authorities from their duties;
or deterring, intimidating, or preventing persons
from voting, exercising their civil rights, or
answering questions in connection with any census
or survey provided for by title 13 of the United
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States Code.
Section 1042. Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Damages for
Violations of Section 1041.
(a) Civil Enforcement by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General may bring a civil action in the appropriate United
States district court against any person who engages in
conduct constituting an offense under subsection (b) or (c) of
section 1041 and, upon proof of such conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to
a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or
the amount of compensation which the person received or
offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever amount is
greater. The imposition of a civil penalty under this subsection
does not preclude any other criminal or civil statutory,
common law, or administrative remedy, which is available by
law to the United States or any other person.
(b) Injunctive Relief. If the Attorney General has reason to
believe that a person is engaged in conduct constituting an
offense under subsection (b) or (c) of section 1041, the
Attorney General may petition an appropriate United States
district court for an order prohibiting that person from
engaging in such conduct. The court may issue an order
prohibiting that person from engaging in such conduct if the
court finds that the conduct constitutes such an offense. The
filing of a petition under this section does not preclude any
other remedy which is available by law to the United States or
any other person.
(c) Civil Action for Damages. Whoever engages in conduct
constituting an offense under subsection (b) or subsection (c)
of section 1041 is liable in a civil action to any person
incurring expenses incident to any emergency or investigative
response to the information that violated subsection (b) of
section 1041; to any person incurring expenses incident to any
efforts required to correct the fraudulent civic misinformation;
to any person incurring injury, illness, or loss of life, loss of
personal property, loss of an opportunity to vote in an election,
loss of civil rights, loss or denial of government services, or
expenses, including medical or legal expenses, as a result of
the fraudulent civic misinformation; or for injunctive or other
equitable relief to prevent substantial public harm. The court
may grant any such relief upon finding by a preponderance of
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the evidence that the defendant has engaged in conduct
constituting an offense under subsection (b) or subsection (c)
of section 1041.
Section 4. Liability for Promoting Encouragement of Violence.
(a) Chapter 21 of the United States Code Title 42 is amended by
adding the following:
Section 1986a. Criminal Liability for Amplifying
Encouragement of Violence.
(a) In general—Any person who knowingly and
intentionally disseminates on the internet, in interstate
commerce and in a manner calculated to reach 500 or
more viewers, a communication that solicits, commands,
induces, encourages, or otherwise endeavors to persuade
another person or persons to kidnap or cause death or
serious bodily injury to any person, or to engage in
conduct constituting a felony that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against property or against the person of another, in
violation of the laws of the United States, including but
not limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 42 U.S.C. § 1986,
whether or not such communications identify a specific
person or property as the target of such actions, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years,
or both.
(b) Publishing Entity Liability. Any publishing entity or
person acting on behalf of a publishing entity, who, in
interstate or foreign commerce,
(1) disseminates, publishes, or broadcasts a
communication that solicits, commands, induces,
encourages, or otherwise endeavors to persuade
another person or persons to kidnap or cause death
or serious bodily injury to any person, or to engage
in conduct constituting a felony that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against property or against the person
of another, in violation of the laws of the United
States, including but not limited to 42 U.S.C. § 1985
and 42 U.S.C. § 1986, whether or not such
communications identify a specific person or
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property as the target of such actions;
(2) conducts individualized targeting to disseminate,
publish, or broadcast such communication; and
(3) causes the communication to be viewed, seen, or
read 10,000 or more times within the United States
by means of dissemination, publication, or broadcast
that is controlled or owned, in whole or in part, by
the publishing entity,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both.
(c) Definitions.
(1) “Individualized targeting” occurs when a publishing
entity:
(A) performs or causes to perform any
computational process (including one based on
algorithmic models, machine learning,
statistical analysis, or other data processing or
artificial intelligence techniques) designed to
transmit or display, highlight, emphasize, or
make more prominent, the content to a subset
of the users of such platform selected based on
personal information pertaining to the
individuals who make up the subset of users; or
(B) allows another person to instruct a publishing
entity to transmit or display, highlight,
emphasize, or make more prominent, the
content to a subset of the users of such
publishing entity, including by providing to
such person a list of individuals, contact
information of individuals, or other personal
information that can be used to identify
individuals;
Provided, however, that displaying, highlighting,
emphasizing, or making more prominent, content in
direct response to requests made or search terms entered
by an individual, such that any individual making such
requests or entering such search terms would produce the
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same display, does not constitute individualized targeting
under this section.
(2) “Personal information” means any information that
is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific
individual or a specific device, including but not
limited to an individual’s actual or perceived
characteristics or demographics and information that
may be derived from such individual’s internet
browsing history, and including de-identified
information.
(3) “Publishing entity” means any print publisher;
radio-broadcast licensee; broadcast, cable, or local
television station; provider of an interactive
computer service as defined in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(2); covered online platform as defined in 47
U.S.C. § 232(d)(1); or agency or medium for the
dissemination of advertising.
Section 1986b. Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Damages for
Violations of Section 1986a.
(a) Civil Enforcement by the Attorney General. The
Attorney General may bring a civil action in the
appropriate United States district court against any person
who engages in conduct constituting an offense under
section 1986a and, upon proof of such conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be
subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each violation or the amount of compensation which the
person received or offered for the prohibited conduct,
whichever amount is greater. The imposition of a civil
penalty under this subsection does not preclude any other
criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative
remedy which is available by law to the United States or
any other person.
(b) Injunctive Relief. If the Attorney General has reason to
believe that a person is engaged in conduct constituting
an offense under section 1986a, the Attorney General
may petition an appropriate United States district court
for an order prohibiting that person from engaging in
such conduct. The court may issue an order prohibiting
that person from engaging in such conduct if the court
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finds that the conduct constitutes such an offense. The
filing of a petition under this section does not preclude
any other remedy which is available by law to the United
States or any other person.
(c) Civil Action for Damages. Whoever engages in conduct
constituting an offense under section 1986a is liable in a
civil action to any person, group of persons, or entity
against whom such communication were made, who were
injured or harmed as a consequence of such
communication, or whose property was injured or harmed
as a consequence of such communication, whether or not
such person or entity was identified by name in the
communication, in an action for damages occasioned by
such communication, for injunctive relief, or for other
appropriate relief. The court may grant any such relief
upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant has engaged in conduct constituting an offense
under section 1986a.
Section 5. Amendments to Section 230 and Restrictions on Targeted
Advertising and Collection and Sale of Personal Information.
(a) Section 230(c)(1) of the Communication Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. 230(c)(1)) is amended to read:
(1) Treatment of Publisher or Speaker.
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
In any civil action against a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (“ICS”) arising from information provided
by another information content provider, the ICS shall not be
held liable as the publisher or speaker of that information
unless the ICS:
1. Engages in targeting the dissemination of the
content to an individual or specific group of
individuals;
2. Acts knowingly, recklessly or negligently in
encouraging or facilitating the spread of
misinformation, disinformation, or violence; or
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3. Intentionally engages in a course of business that
receives a financial benefit from amplifying
misinformation, disinformation, or violence.
(b) Section 230(f) of the Communication Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
230(f)) is amended by adding the following:
(5) Targeting the Dissemination of Content.
An ICS engages in “targeting the dissemination of content to a
particular individual or specific group of individuals” if the
ICS, or an agent, affiliate, vendor, or other person acting on
behalf of such ICS—
(A) performs or causes to perform any computational
process (including one based on algorithmic models,
machine learning, statistical analysis, or other data
processing or artificial intelligence techniques)
designed to transmit or display, highlight,
emphasize, or make more prominent, the content to
a subset of the users of such platform selected based
on personal information pertaining to the individuals
who make up the subset of users; or
(B) allows another person to instruct an ICS to transmit
or display, highlight, emphasize, or make more
prominent, the content to a subset of the users of
such ICS, including by providing to such ICS a list
of individuals, contact information of individuals, or
other personal information that can be used to
identify individuals.
Provided, however, that displaying, highlighting,
emphasizing, or making more prominent, content in
direct response to requests made or search terms entered
by an individual, such that any individual making such
requests or entering such search terms would produce the
same display, does not constitute targeting under this
section.
(6) Personal Information.
The term “personal information” means any information that
is linked or reasonably linkable to a specific individual or a
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specific device, including but not limited to an individual’s
actual or perceived characteristics or demographics and
information that may be derived from such individual’s
internet browsing history, and including de-identified
information.
(c) Chapter 5 of Title 47, United States is amended by adding the
following:
Section 232. Restrictions on Targeted Online Advertising
(a) Restrictions on Advertisements Targeted at
Individuals or at Specific Groups of Individuals.
(1) Restrictions. A covered online platform or an
agent, affiliate, vendor, or other person acting
on behalf of such a platform, may not target the
dissemination of an advertisement on such
platform to an individual or to a specific group
of individuals on any basis.
(2) Actions Constituting Targeting. A covered
online platform or an agent, affiliate, vendor, or
other person acting on behalf of such a
platform shall be considered to target the
dissemination of an advertisement to an
individual or to a specific group of individuals
if such platform—
(A) (i) performs or causes to perform any
computational process (including one
based on algorithmic models, machine
learning, statistical analysis, or other data
processing or artificial intelligence
techniques) designed to transmit or
display, highlight, emphasize, or make
more prominent, the advertisement to a
subset of the users of such platform
selected based on personal information
pertaining to the individuals who make up
the subset of users; or
(ii) allows another person to instruct a
covered online platform to transmit or
display, highlight, emphasize, or make
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more prominent, the advertisement to a
subset of the users of such platform,
including by providing to such platform a
list of individuals, contact information of
individuals, or other personal information
that can be used to identify individuals;
and
(B) receives a fee or other payment, directly
or indirectly, for disseminating the
advertisement or providing the
information.
(3) Exception: Targeting Individuals within a
Governmental District. Subsection (a) does not
apply to the targeting of the dissemination of an
advertisement to an individual residing in, or to
a device located in, a Governmental District.
(4) Sorting Based on Individual Search Terms or
Requests. Displaying, highlighting,
emphasizing or making more prominent,
advertising or other content in direct response
to requests made or search terms entered by an
individual, such that any individual making
such requests or entering such search terms
would produce the same display, does not
constitute targeting under subsection (a).
(b) Private Right of Action.
(1) Enforcement by Individuals.
(A) In general. Any person alleging a
violation of this section by a covered
online platform may bring a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction, State
or Federal.
(B) Relief. In a civil action brought under this
paragraph in which the plaintiff prevails,
the court may award—
(i) an amount not less than $100 and not
greater than $1,000 per violation
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against any person who negligently
violates a provision of this section;
(ii) an amount not less than $500 and not
greater than $5,000 per violation
against any person who recklessly,
willfully, or intentionally violates a
provision of this section;
(iii) reasonable attorney’s fees and
litigation costs; and
(iv) any other relief, including equitable
or declaratory relief, that the court
determines appropriate.
(C) Injury in Fact. A violation of this section
constitutes a concrete and particularized
injury in fact to an individual.
(2) Invalidity of Pre-Dispute Arbitration
Agreements and Pre-Dispute Joint Action
Waivers.
(A) In general. Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no pre-dispute
arbitration agreement or pre-dispute joint
action waiver shall be valid or enforceable
with respect to a dispute arising under this
section.
(B) Applicability. Any determination as to
whether or how this subsection applies to
any dispute shall be made by a court,
rather than an arbitrator, without regard to
whether such agreement purports to
delegate such determination to an
arbitrator.
(C) Definitions. In this subsection:
(i) “Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement”
means any agreement to arbitrate a
dispute that has not arisen at the time
of making the agreement.

CLEMENTS (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/24/22 5:43 PM

BIG TECH ACCOUNTABILITY ACT

31

(ii) “Pre-Dispute Joint-Action Waiver”
means an agreement, whether or not
part of a pre-dispute arbitration
agreement, that would prohibit, or
waive the right of, one of the parties
to the agreement to participate in a
joint, class, or collective action in a
judicial, arbitral, administration, or
other forum, concerning a dispute
that has not yet arisen at the time of
making the agreement.
(iii) “Dispute” means any claim related to
an alleged violation of this section
and between an individual and a
covered organization.
(c) Enforcement by Attorney General.
(1) Civil Action for Fines. The Attorney General
may bring a civil action in the appropriate
United States district court against any person
who engages in conduct in violation of this
section. In any such action the district court
may award appropriate relief in including a
civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each
violation or the amount of compensation which
the person received or offered for the
prohibited conduct, whichever amount is
greater. The imposition of a civil penalty under
this subsection does not preclude any other
remedy which is available by law to the United
States or any other person.
(2) Injunctive Relief. If the Attorney General has
reason to believe that a person is engaged in
conduct in violation of this section, the
Attorney General may petition an appropriate
United States district court for an order
prohibiting that person from engaging in such
conduct. The court may issue an order
prohibiting that person from engaging in such
conduct if the court finds that the conduct
constitutes such a violation. The filing of a
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petition under this section does not preclude
any other remedy which is available by law to
the United States or any other person.
(d) Effective Date. Section 232 of Title 47, United
States Code shall take effect 3 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
(e) Definitions. In this section:
(1) “Covered Online Platform” means any website,
web application, mobile application, smart
device application, digital application
(including a social network, or search engine),
or advertising network (including a network
disseminating advertisements on another
website, web application, mobile application,
smart device application, or digital
application).
(2) “Personal Information” means any information
that is linked or reasonably linkable to a
specific individual or a specific device,
including but not limited to an individual’s
actual or perceived characteristics or
demographics and information that may be
derived from such individual’s internet
browsing history, and including de-identified
information.
(3) “Governmental District” means any of the
following:
(A) Each State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam,
American Samoa, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
United States Virgin Islands.
(B) Indian and tribal lands as defined and
recognized under federal law.
(C) A county, municipality, city, town,
township, village, borough, or similar unit
of general government incorporated under
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State law or as defined by the Census
Bureau; or
(D) A congressional district.
Section 233. Restrictions on Collection, Aggregation, and
Sale of Personal Information
(a) Congressional Finding.
The Congress finds that the widespread practice of
websites, internet service companies, and data brokers,
among others, collecting, aggregating, and selling
personal information of individuals derived from their
internet activity (“online personal information”) poses a
grave threat to personal privacy and autonomy.
(b) Congressional Purpose and Policy.
The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy to
protect personal privacy and autonomy by restricting the
exploitive collection, aggregation, and sale of online
personal information and to prohibit the collection,
aggregation, and sale of any individual’s online personal
information without the genuine, informed and
meaningful consent of such individual.
(c) FTC Recommendations to Prohibit the
Aggregation and Sale of Personal Information
without Consent.
In order to protect personal privacy and autonomy, the
Federal Trade Commission is hereby directed to study
and make recommendations for specific reforms and
legislation restricting the collection, aggregation, or sale
of online personal information and prohibiting the
collection, aggregation, or sale of any individual’s online
personal information without the genuine, informed, and
meaningful consent of such individual. Among other
provisions, the FTC shall include in its recommendations,
provisions establishing that blanket consent obtained as a
condition to accessing information or services on the
internet shall not be considered meaningful consent.
(d) Deadline for FTC Recommendations.
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The Federal Trade Commission shall submit a report to
Congress containing the recommendations required by
this section within 120 days of enactment of this Act.

